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The credit crisis roiling the world’s financial markets will likely take years and entire careers
to fully understand and analyze. A short empirical investigation of the current trends, however,
demonstrates that the losses in certain markets, in this case the US equity markets, follow a cascade
or epidemic flow like model along the correlations of various stocks. A few images and explanation
here will suffice to show the phenomenon. Also, whether the idea of “epidemic” or a“cascade” is a
metaphor or model for this crisis will be discussed.
PACS numbers: 89.65.Gh, 89.75.Hc
I. INTRODUCTION
The barely covered story of rising foreclosures among
the condominiums of Florida or California in early 2007
was a harbinger of a much larger collapse in the world-
wide financial system. The increase of foreclosures over
the priced in foreclosure risk in mortgage backed secu-
rities, otherwise deemed high-grade assets, began the
confusion of the value of collateral assets and subse-
quent seizing up of credit markets around the globe.
The collapse of several institutions such as Bear Stearns,
Lehman, and Fortis has accentuated the level of crisis
now facing the world markets. Previous loosely regu-
lated titans of finance such as hedge funds and private
equity groups have been hit by waves of unprecedented
losses and demands by investors for redemptions, caus-
ing them to sell even more assets or close positions and
creating a positive feedback death spiral.
Though the hardest hit markets are lesser-known mar-
kets such as commercial paper, the equity markets have
become the most widely known indicators of the ongo-
ing meltdown. In fact, most non-experts likely use the
movements of the equity markets, fallaciously, as a key
gauge of the severity or progress of the crisis. The eq-
uity markets, however, did not originate the crisis nor are
they the key force perpetuating it. In this short paper,
the spread of the credit crisis will be discussed by refer-
ring to a correlation network of stocks in the S&P 500
and NASDAQ-100 indices. The fact that the spread re-
sembles a contagion or cascade, however, may be mainly
superficial given the underlying dynamics are completely
different.
II. NETWORK CONSTRUCTION
In this paper, a stock correlation network is created
similar to the one in work by [1–3]. A correlation matrix
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of the returns between the two stocks is created where
the correlation between stocks i and j is defined as
ρij =
E((Xi − µi)(Xj − µj))
σiσj
(1)
The correlation is taken over the time period August
1, 2007 to October 10, 2008 where each daily value of X
is the log-return of the closing price from the previous
day. As [1, 2] demonstrate, however, correlation is not a
distance metric, therefore we create an adjacency matrix
with weights on the edges matching the distance metric
between stocks, i and j, defined as
d =
√
2(1− ρij) (2)
Using these distances we finally create a minimal span-
ning tree using the python-graph module and animate
using pydot and Graphviz. Because over 500 stocks are
included, the ticker labels are relatively small but the cen-
tral part of the component is dominated (though not ex-
clusively) by FIRE (finance, insurance, real estate) stocks
which are heavily cross-correlated and thus tightly linked
with each other, while the outer branches are more in-
dustry specific and are the later impacted stocks by the
credit crisis.
The stocks, represented as nodes, are colored according
to the following methodology based on the stock return
since August 1, 2007.
Green nodes represent a current return greater than
-10%. Yellow nodes represent a current return between
-10% and -25%. Red nodes represent a current return
less than -25%.
Events in the figures are taken from the timeline at [4].
III. DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
As has been viewed by the wider market, the collapse
in stock price returns begins in the FIRE sector of the
economy first affecting housing and subsequently finance
stocks. Soon it moved across more mainline banks and
2FIG. 1: August 10, 2007 - the beginning of the trouble
FIG. 2: September 14, 2007 - Northern Rock bailout by the
British government
firms and finally, more recently has affected stocks across
the board. Though the paper title contains the word
epidemiology and though the spread of the collapse in
stocks down the tree resembles an infection or cascade
on a network, such ideas are more appropriately viewed
as analogies or metaphors than explanations. Unlike a
disease or cascading collapse, the stock crash is not being
transmitted from one stock to another. The correlation
just reveals a concerted collapse caused and underlined
by a systemic crisis in the financial system.
The spread is more likely carried by the news of the
extent of the crisis expanding and the fact that similar
FIG. 3: January 17, 2008 - January 2008 market turbulence
FIG. 4: March 17, 2008 - Bear Sterns collapses
asset bases and capital structures make highly correlated
stocks similarly vulnerable. As panic and the extent of
the devastation spreads, stocks are punished accordingly.
In normal times, the failure of a company and its stock
is not a cause for a systemic crisis. Also, since the cor-
relation was calculated over an entire year’s activity, the
stock prices are correlated since they tend to fall simi-
larly over time. The correlation shown in this network
does not cause the transmission chain of collapse but is
inextricably tied to it. In addition, correlation generally
increases with volatility (for example, see [5]) and nega-
tive returns effect volatility more than positive returns of
the same magnitude [6, 7]. So over time the correlation
3FIG. 5: September 15, 2008 - Lehman Brothers collapses
FIG. 6: October 10, 2008 - Largest Dow closing drop in his-
tory
has been increasing among stocks and the network will
likely be more dense and structure differently due to the
steadily increasing market volatility.
Finally, one should note, this is not an example of the
widely cited ’financial contagion’ in the press. Financial
contagion refers to the coupling of financial panic across
national borders and not among stocks in an exchange.
However, these do illustrate the spread of the credit crisis
and how what was once a problem among home builders
and mortgage finance companies has engulfed the entire
economy.
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